It is not just that seeking to placate the public at home with braggadocio overseas will make it harder still for China to garner allies and respect. There is a deeper problem. Many countries around the world admire, and would like to emulate, the undemocratic but effective way that China has managed its decades of growth. If China’s domestic politics look less stable, some of that admiration will wane. And even if things can be held together, for the time being, admiration for China does not translate into affection for it, or into a sense of common cause. Economically and militarily, China has come a long way towards regaining the centrality in Asia it enjoyed through much of history. Intellectually and morally, it has not. In the old days it held a “soft power” so strong, according to William Kirby of Harvard University, that “neighbours converted themselves” to it. Now, Mr Xi may know how to assert himself and how to be feared, at home and abroad. But without the ability to exert a greater power of attraction, too, such strength will always tend to destabilise.
The last reason f or the defeat of this treaty was that the senate foreign relations committee was felling very left out after President Wilson did this with the aim of putting all the 14 points into the treaty. Congress became very angry over the negotiations since President Wilson was simply trying to undercut them, and thus they refused to ratify the treaty. In short, three factors le to the defeat of this treaty which include; the strength of opposition, opposition of League of Nations, and the Senate Foreign Relations committee's discontent (Seward, 1966).